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Abstract
In many markets, consumers obtain price quotes before making purchases. This paper
considers a xed-sample size model of consumer search for price quotes when sellers must spend
resources to learn the true cost of providing goods/services. It is found that (1) even with ex
ante identical consumers and sellers, there is price dispersion in the equilibrium; (2) the expected
equilibrium price can decrease with the search cost of consumers; (3) consumers may engage in
excessive search that is detrimental to their own welfare; (4) a decline in the search cost can
leave consumers worse o¤, due to their lack of commitment. (JEL D40, L00)
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In order to make an informed purchase decision, consumers search. In order to earn their
business, sellers provide relevant information such as prices. The standard economic models of
consumer search assume that price search is costly, but price setting is costless.1 The best example
of sellers in these models is perhaps a supermarket, which sets prices before consumer search takes
place. Consumers are assumed to know the distribution of prices (presumably from repeated
purchases), but do not know the prices charged by particular stores until they search.2
However, in many markets, even a simple price quote may involve nontrivial costs for the seller.
For example, a repair shop must diagnose the problem before giving a cost estimate; a mortgage
lender must evaluate a borrowers creditworthiness before issuing a rate quote; an insurance agent
must assess an applicants risk characteristics before determining the premium; a travel agent may
have to compare di¤erent itineraries and consult with multiple airlines before o¤ering an airfare deal.
Unlike a supermarket, sellers in these markets make costly e¤orts to learn the production costs based
on the needs of the individual consumers, and therefore can only set prices after consumer search
takes place. The process of consumer search works much like a rst-price sealed-bid procurement
auction: each seller submits a bid without knowing its competitorsbids. A consumer can canvass a
number of sellers, but cannot impose an alternative mechanism within which the sellers compete, nor
is the purchase made frequently such that the consumer and the seller have a long-term relationship,
the lack of which precludes the parties from contracting on the sellers e¤ort in preparing the price
quote.
This paper incorporates the above features into a theory of consumer search, which nests a
model of sealed-bid common value auction, to study the impact of precontract costs including
consumer search cost and price setting cost. The latter cost is due to uncertainty in the production
cost. To facilitate comparison with relevant papers, I use an example adapted from Pesendorfer
and Wolinsky (2003) to illustrate. Consider a homeowner who nds that her air conditioning does
not work properly. She asks contractors for repair cost estimates. A contractor may send a skilled
worker at a high cost or an unskilled worker at a low cost. The unskilled worker recommends a
1 It is a long tradition that began with Stiglers seminal paper (1961). More recently, a class of search models with
an "information clearinghouse" assume nearly the opposite, that is, zero (marginal) search cost but positive (xed)
advertising cost (Baye and Morgan 2001).
2This assumption is relaxed in Rothschild (1974), Benabou and Gertner (1993) and Dana (1994), where consumers
learn about the distribution of prices as they search, and in Daughety (1992), where consumers search without price
precommitment by sellers.
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generic repair (e.g., replacement of an expensive part), whereas the skilled worker might be able to
diagnose the actual problem and nd a less expensive solution.3 The homeowner cannot distinguish
the skilled from the unskilled worker. By assuming that the repair outcome is not contractible (but
price search is costless),4 Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) examine the market ine¢ ciencies when
a consumer must rely on second opinions to pick the right contractor.
In contrast, this paper assumes that the success of the repair can be veried, so the homeowner
only needs to select the contractor who o¤ers the lowest price (along with the same warranty),
but the contractorsproblem is complicated by the need to diagnose before competitive bidding: if
he expects the homeowner to do comparison shopping and canvass a large number of contractors,
then he may be less inclined to send the skilled worker, a sunk cost that cannot be recovered in a
bidding war. In the equilibrium, some contractors send skilled workers before submitting informed
bids, but their expected prots net of the diagnosis cost must be equal to those of contractors that
send unskilled workers to submit blind quotes. Ultimately the consumer bears the diagnosis cost.
While this observation suggests an equivalence between consumer search and contractor diagnosis 
both are simultaneously benecial (discovery of a less expensive solution) and wasteful (duplicative
e¤orts)  our analysis of the contractors problem reveals an important di¤erence: the only way
to save on the total search cost is to search less, but paradoxically a consumer can potentially save
on the total diagnosis cost by searching more. The latter is true if the contractorswillingness
to incur the diagnosis cost drops sharply when they face more competitors. Consequently, price
setting cost and search cost can have very di¤erent, even opposite, impacts on consumer search
behavior. For example, if the price setting cost is zero then the optimal number of searches is two,
but it may be innity when the search cost vanishes. More generally, while the optimal number
of searches always decreases with the search cost, it can sometimes increase with the price setting
cost. Furthermore, price dispersion persists even with ex ante identical consumers and sellers and
even if consumer search is costless.
The introduction of price setting cost also a¤ects the timing of the game, which raises a com-
mitment issue that has not been previously investigated. If sellers set prices before consumer search
3This is where my example di¤ers from the model of Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003), which assumes that the
costs of performing any potential services are identical, but the outcomes can be di¤erent. In addition, their model
assumes that prices are set before the diagnosis, not after.
4Their model contains a search cost, but it is not paid until a contract o¤er is accepted.
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takes place, as in all models with posted prices, then sellers are always the Stackelberg leader; but
if prices are set upon consumer request, then the game between the consumer and sellers can either
be sequential in nature, or simultaneous, depending on whether the consumer can commit. If a
consumer can act as a Stackelberg leader and precommit to the number of searches before sellers
submit their bids, then the number of searches will be optimal, but this is not always the case. As
argued by Wolinsky (2005), an individual consumer may not have signicant commitment power.
In the current paper, the lack of commitment is due to a credibility problem: holding constant the
sellerspricing strategies, a searcher always benets from sampling a larger size, and therefore she
cannot credibly convince sellers that her actual number of searches will be the announced num-
ber. This is especially true if the number of price quotes is private information. In this setting, I
nd that the expected equilibrium price can decrease with search cost. Moreover, consumers may
engage in excessive search that is detrimental to their own welfare, and therefore a decline in the
search cost can leave consumers worse o¤.
The literature on consumer search originates from Stigler (1961), which discusses the optimal
search strategy of a consumer faced with an exogenously specied price distribution. While his
paper shows that price dispersion is consistent with costly search, it does not really explain why
sellers charge di¤erent prices. Numerous papers have since been written and provided a variety of
explanations, but none of them has deviated from Stiglers assumption that consumers take the
price distribution as given. In these models, regardless of whether consumers engage in simul-
taneous search or sequential search, equilibrium is derived by equating the cost of obtaining an
additional price quote to the expected price reduction from the additional search.5 Underlying it
all is the presumption that, with price dispersion, more searches lead to discovery of better prices.
Consequently, despite many di¤erences, these papers have the following results in common: a)
expected price increases with search cost; b) consumer welfare decreases with search cost; c) the
degree of price dispersion among homogeneous sellers decreases with search cost. This paper shows
that none of these results is necessarily true in markets where prices are set after consumer search.
This is because, contrary to Stiglers assumption, price distributions will be a¤ected by consumers
search intensity in these markets.
5 In the class of "information clearinghouse" models exemplied by Baye and Morgan (2001), the number of
consumer searches is exogenous, but sellersparticipation decisions are endogenous.
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More broadly, this paper contributes to our understanding of transaction costs. Coase (1960)
denes transaction cost as follows:"In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to
discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on
what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake
the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so
on." More succinctly, Dahlman (1979) classies transaction costs into three categories based on
the stages of a contract: search and information costs (precontract), bargaining and decision costs
(contract), policing and enforcement costs (postcontract). While the impact of consumer search
cost on market outcome has spawned a huge amount of research e¤orts, its interaction with sellers
precontract cost has so far received scant attention. A notable exception is French and McKormick
(1984), whose informal analysis of the service market anticipates many of the themes explored in
this paper. Their paper was also the rst to point out the analogue between the usual process for
purchasing services in the consumer goods market and a sealed-bid auction.6 After showing that
the winners expected prot equals the sum of his competitorssunk costs of bid preparation under
a free-entry condition, they argue that consumers indirectly pay for sellersprecontract costs. The
focus of their paper, however, is on sellersmarketing strategies, such as how likely sellers are to
charge for their estimates or advertise, whereas the focus of this paper is on the problem faced by
the consumer side.7
To the best of my knowledge, Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) and Wolinsky (2005) are the
only other papers that consider consumer search in the presence of precontract costs. Both study
the markets for procurement contracts, but focus on di¤erent information problems. Wolinsky
(2005)s main nding that consumers engage in an ine¢ ciently excessive search is the same as
mine. The underlying mechanism is also similar: the impossibility of contracting on the sellers
e¤ort distorts consumerssearch incentive. However, there is an important di¤erence: in Wolinskys
model sellers e¤orts improve the quality of service, but in the current model e¤orts are made
to extract information rents. As a result, the two models have opposite predictions about the
welfare properties of e¤orts. In addition, in his model, while search intensity is excessive from a
6Other papers that have emphasized the close connection between auction and search include McAfee and McMillan
(1988) and Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2006). The latter also provides an extensive review of the search literature.
7Due to the lack of formal game-theoretic analysis, the connection between assumptions and results is somewhat
opaque in their paper. For example, it is not clear whether the predicted pattern is the result of collective behavior
among sellers or the noncooperative outcome.
4
social planners point of view, it is optimal for the consumer, but in this model excessive search is
detrimental to the consumer herself as well as social welfare. The papers also use di¤erent modeling
approaches: he uses a sequential search model in the context of a market for a di¤erentiated
product, whereas I use a xed-sample size model with homogeneous products. The two approaches
are complementary.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the model and dis-
cusses assumptions. Section 2 presents some preliminary results. Section 3 characterizes the full
equilibrium for both when the consumer is able to commit to the optimal number of searches and
when she is not. Section 4 concludes.
1 The Model
A consumer is willing to pay v for a good or service (henceforth, the product), which can be
provided by any one of the N  2 sellers. In order to nd the best deal, the consumer visits sellers
to collect price quotes. The cost of e¤ort for each visit is s, i.e., the search cost. Sellers face the
same production cost, but it can take two values: a low cost of cl with a probability of q or a high
cost of ch with a probability of 1   q: At a cost of t; a seller can acquire information to learn the
actual production cost. Sellers are risk neutral. The values of all above variables are assumed to
be common knowledge.
The game is played in the following order:
1. The consumer requests prices quotes from n sellers;8
2. Each seller, upon request, chooses whether to incur t to acquire information about the produc-
tion cost: if a seller acquires information, it quotes a price from the distribution of either Fl (p)
or Fh (p), depending on whether the cost is cl or ch; if a seller does not acquire information,
it quotes a price from the distribution of Fb (p) :
3. After receiving all price quotes, the consumer buys from the seller that o¤ers the lowest price.
8Since each seller quotes one price, n represents the number of price quotes as well as the number of consumers
searches or the number of sellers visited by the consumer, or simply the search intensity as in Janssen and Moraga-
Gonzalez (2004).
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A complete specication of the game also requires us to specify whether n belongs to the sellers
information set when they compete at stage 2. If n is publicly observable, then the consumer can act
as a Stackelberg leader and commit to the optimal number of searches; but if n is non-contractible
private information, then the consumer and sellers will be playing a simultaneous move game at
the rst two stages. Both possibilities will be considered.
It is not di¢ cult to see that Fh (p) is a degenerate distribution, where Fh (p) = 0 for p < ch and
Fh (p) = 1 for p  ch: Therefore, the equilibrium will be characterized by the consumers choice of n
and sellersstrategies in a triplet f; Fl (p) ; Fb (p)g ; where  is the probability of a seller choosing
to assess the production cost, Fl (p) is the cumulative distribution function of price quote when a
seller learns that the production cost is low, and Fb (p) is the distribution function when a seller
submits a "blind" quote. Sellers use pure strategies in pricing if and only if price distributions are
degenerate. The solution concept is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The consumer and sellers form
beliefs about each others strategies. In the equilibrium, their beliefs are correct.
For ease of exposition, I impose the following restrictions on parameter values. First, I assume
that v >> s so that it is never optimal for the consumer to search just one seller, in which case she
minimizes the total search costs but has to pay a monopoly price for the product; in other words,
n  2: Second, I assume that the pool of sellers is so large that the consumers number of searches
is never limited by the number of sellers, i.e., N !1. Last, I assume that the cost of information
acquisition does not exceed the private value of the information, i.e., t < q (1  q) (ch   cl). These
restrictions cut down the number of cases we have to consider and allow us to focus on only the
nontrivial cases, but they do not change or weaken any of the qualitative results.
1.1 Discussion of Assumptions
In order to keep the model tractable and have a stark contrast with the existing literature, this
paper has introduced a very simple model that focuses on only the most important aspects of the
markets and assumes away some of the admittedly more realistic features. Here I discuss the key
assumptions and justify the use of some simplifying assumptions.
Homogenous Sellers At the last stage of the game, the consumer choice is based on price
only. This is a common assumption in the consumer search literature. At the same time, it is a
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natural assumption given the papers focus on the transaction costs at the precontract stage. After
all, without having to incur additional transaction costs at later stages, sellers can o¤er complete
contracts that cover all aspects of the product, including design, quality, warranty, price, etc. This
means that we can collapse all these variables into a single one  "price"  and assume all other
aspects of the product to be uniform across sellers. Essentially, sellers can be viewed as competing
in utility space.
At the bidding stage, the game is modeled as a common value procurement auction since sellers
are assumed to be ex ante identical. This may not be a realistic assumption: sellers costs are
likely correlated, but not necessarily the same. Nonetheless, I make this assumption to ensure that
equilibrium price dispersion cannot be attributed to di¤erent cost realizations across sellers.
The assumption of homogenous sellers is also consistent with empirical research in related
markets. For example, in her study of the auto insurance market, Honka (2014) assumes that the
only search dimension is the premium charged by each provider. Moreover, she reports that over
93% of consumers kept their coverage choice the same during the last shopping occasion and were
searching only for the lowest premium. Similarly, in their study of the Canadian mortgage market,
Allen, Clark and Houde (2014) nd that contracts are homogeneous, and for a given consumer costs
are mostly common across lenders due to loan securitization and a government insurance program.
Uncertainty in Production Cost The production cost is assumed to be a binary random
variable for tractability. Admittedly, this is a crude assumption, but it is in line with the home
repair example. For other markets, it is also relevant: a mortgage broker or an insurance agents
precontract e¤ort involves identifying the variety of discounts available to an applicant based on
her risk characteristics; a travel agent or a car dealers e¤ort involves nding out the existence of
airline promotions or manufacturer incentives. The same assumption is also used by Pesendorfer
and Wolinsky (2003). As for the source of the cost uncertainty, it can be internal, (i.e., consumer
specic), or external, (e.g., due to input cost variations).
Fixed-sample Size Search There are two basic types of models used in the search literature:
xed-sample size search models assume that consumers sample a xed number of sellers and choose
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to buy the lowest priced alternative,9 whereas sequential search models assume that consumers
visit sellers one-by-one and do not stop searching until their reservation price is met.
There are several reasons why I assume xed-sample size search. First, existing empirical
evidence suggests that xed-sample size search provides a more accurate description of observed
consumer search behavior (De los Santos, Hortacsu, and Wildenbeest 2012, Honka and Chintagunta
2017); second, xed-sample size search is optimal when there is a xed-cost component to search.
Recall the example of a homeowner in need of repair cost estimates: if she has to take a day o¤ from
work for the visits of the contractors, then it will be more e¢ cient to schedule multiple appointments
beforehand so that all visits take place during the same day than to follow a prolonged process
from sequential searches. Third, but particularly relevant to this model, when price setting involves
costly assessment, a price quote often comes after a delay so the consumer can engage in additional
searches while waiting for the outcome from a previous search.10
It should also be noted that there is a subtle di¤erence between the commitment problem
behind the common criticism against the xed-sample size approach of modeling consumer search
and the commitment problem highlighted in this paper. The former is about a consumers inability
to commit to the xed-sample size strategy itself when the expected marginal benet of an extra
search exceeds the cost, but the latter is the consumers inability to commit to the optimal number
of searches. In economic environments where xed-sample size search is more advantageous than
sequential search, the issue of commitment to strategy does not bite, but the issue of commitment
to the number of searches may remain; it goes away only if either the number of searches or the
sellersassessment e¤ort becomes publicly observable and contractible, as shown in the analysis
below.
9MacMinn (1980) is the rst to show that equilibrium price dispersion can arise when consumers engage in xed-
sample size search, but his result relies on cost heterogeneity among sellers. Burdett and Judd (1983) provides a model
of equilibrium price dispersion with ex ante identical consumers and sellers. In the equilibrium price distribution, all
sellers charge positive markups. A fraction of consumers visit one store and purchase, while the remaining fraction
of consumers search two stores and buy from whichever o¤ers the lower price. Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez (2004)
develop an oligopolistic version of Burdett and Judd (1983) where some consumers search costlessly. They show that
the equilibrium expected price may be constant, increasing or non-monotonic in the number of sellers, depending on
the equilibrium consumerssearch intensity and the existing number of sellers. In particular, they nd that duopoly
yields identical expected price and price dispersion but higher welfare than an innite number of sellers.
10 In the same vein, Morgan and Manning (1985) and Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez (2004) argue that xed-sample
size search is more appealing when a consumer needs to gather price information quickly.
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Estimation Fee A problem highlighted in this paper is that sellers cannot be compensated
directly for their precontract e¤orts. One may wonder whether charging consumers an estimation
fee upfront will solve the problem. In fact, a large part of French and McKormicks discussion centers
around the use of an estimation fee to recoup the costs of sellerse¤orts. There are two reasons
why the current model does not include an estimation fee. First, as emphasized by Pesendorfer
and Wolinsky (2003), the diagnosis and estimation of the repair cost is a type of "credence" service
 the sellersassessment e¤ort and outcome are unobservable and thus incontractible. Paying an
estimation fee does not guarantee that a seller will put forth the e¤ort after pocketing the payment.
Second, French and McKormicks discussion is based on the assumption that a repair shop has some
captive consumers  due to prohibitively high search costs  who will choose to pay the estimation
fee even if other repair shops can provide costless estimates.11 In the current model, all consumers
have the same search cost, and therefore all sellers will end up charging zero estimation fee (or a
fee equal to the assessment cost of an unskilled worker) even if they are free to charge a fee. The
same result, based on the standard Bertrand style argument, is obtained in Wolinsky (2005).
2 Preliminary Results
2.1 A Benchmark Result
A useful point of departure is to consider what happens if t = 0; i.e., sellers can costlessly assess
their production costs. This is not only the assumption of a frictionless market, but also the working
assumption of almost all consumer search models. In this case, based on the standard Bertrand
style argument, we can see that the prices will be set equal to the (realized) production cost as
long as there are at least two sellers. A consumer cannot do better by visiting more sellers because
she cannot get a better o¤er, nor can she do better by visiting just one seller, who will charge
a monopoly price. Therefore, it is su¢ cient for the consumer to visit just two sellers to obtain
competitive price quotes while economizing on the search costs. The consumer earns a surplus of
v   cE   2s; where cE = qcl + (1  q) ch is the expected production cost. This serves as a natural
benchmark for the current analysis.
11One of their remarks - shops in low-income neighborhoods are more likely to charge for estimates because of
potential customerslower search costs - appears to contradict this assumption.
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Zero assessment cost, however, is not a necessary condition for the above benchmark outcome.
The same outcome can be obtained even if the assessment cost is positive. It is not di¢ cult to
see why: acquiring information about the production cost allows sellers to earn information rents,
but it is wasteful from the consumers point of view. If she and sellers can contract on the latters
assessment e¤orts, then the consumer can prevent sellers from earning information rents by simply
requiring sellers not to engage in the discovery of production costs.12 The sellers will again compete
a la Bertrand, with each of them quoting a price of cE and earning zero prots. The consumer earns
the same amount of surplus as in the benchmark. Albert straightforward, this result demonstrates
that the assessment cost, in itself, does not necessarily cause welfare loss for the consumer. Rather,
any loss of e¢ ciency is due to the inability to contract on sellersassessment e¤orts. Of course,
if the cost of e¤ort is so high that it exceeds the private value of information, then neither seller
will make an e¤ort even if they are not contractually precluded from doing so. In the model, the
private value of the information on the production cost equals q (1  q) (ch   cl) : The assumption
that t < q (1  q) (ch   cl) allows us to focus on the nontrivial cases.
In both cases, consumer surplus is already maximized when the consumer obtains two competing
price quotes. There is no further gain from requesting additional price quotes.13 Therefore, it does
not matter whether the consumer can commit. Accordingly, I summarize the above results in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 Regardless of whether the number of price quotes is publicly observable or non-
contractible private information, consumer surplus will be maximized in the unique equilibrium if
either (i) t = 0; or (ii) t  q (1  q) (ch   cl) ; or (iii) the consumer and sellers can contract on the
assessment e¤ort. In all three cases, the optimal number of searches is two.
Interestingly, Proposition 1 also shows that the optimal number of searches is the same for
extreme values of t: This suggests that the optimal number of searches may not be monotonic in
t, an observation that will be conrmed later in the analysis.
12This requirement may not work if the consumer has private information, which can potentially lead to an adverse
selection problem. Here I assume away consumer private information on the ground that sellers have more expertise
than consumers in the relevant markets.
13There will be savings from requesting one fewer price quote so the consumer might randomize between searching
once and twice, giving rise to the same result as in Burdett and Judd (1983), but this possibility can be ruled out by
the assumption that n  2:
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2.2 The Subgame Equilibrium at the "Bidding" Stage
In the (stage 2) subgame, n sellers receive request for price quotes. When deciding what price to
quote, these sellers face a problem similar to a sealed-bid common value auction: each seller chooses
whether (or not) to incur a cost to assess the production cost before submitting a bid without
knowing his competitorsbids. This is not a trivial problem, because a pure strategy equilibrium
does not exist for any small but positive assessment cost, i.e., t 2 (0; q (1  q) (ch   cl)):
Lemma 1 If t 2 (0; q (1  q) (ch   cl)); no pure strategy equilibrium exists at the "bidding" stage
in which all sellers make an e¤ort to learn the true cost.
Proof. If all sellers learn the true cost, since this is a common value auction, they will all quote the
same price. As a result, net of the assessment cost t, their prots are negative. If a seller deviates
by not incurring the assessment cost and quoting ch, his prot will be zero, so the deviation is
protable.
Lemma 2 If t 2 (0; q (1  q) (ch   cl)); no pure strategy equilibrium exists at the "bidding" stage
in which no seller makes an e¤ort to learn the true cost.
Proof. If no sellers learns the true cost, then the price must be cE and sellersprots will be zero.
If a seller learns the true cost, he can charge cE   " if the production cost is revealed to be cl: This
happens with a probability of q; so his expected prot is q (cE   cl) = q (1  q) (ch   cl) : It is a
protable deviation if t < q (1  q) (ch   cl).
Having ruled out the existence of a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium for the relevant range
of parameter values, I now examine symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in the subgame at the
bidding stage. The mixed-strategy equilibrium involves two randomizations for sellers: rst, sellers
randomize between submitting an informed quote and submitting a blind quote; second, sellers ran-
domize their price quotes. It is tedious but not di¢ cult to verify that, in a symmetric equilibrium,
the supports of the two price distributions Fl (p) and Fb (p) do not overlap. Given this observation,
if seller i chooses not to make the assessment e¤ort, then his expected prot is
i =
pbZ
pb
dFb (p)
0B@ q (p  cl) (1  )n 1

1  ~Fl (p)
n 1
+ (1  q) (p  ch)
Pn 1
k=0
 
n 1
k

k (1  )n 1 k

1  ~Fb (p)
n 1 k
1CA ;
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where ~Fl (p) and ~Fb (p) are the corresponding price distributions for the n 1 other sellers. Because
of symmetry, ~Fl (p)  Fl (p) and ~Fb (p)  Fb (p) : In a mixed strategy equilibrium, seller i must be
indi¤erent among all choices of p on the support of

pl; pl

; i.e.,
(1)
q (p  cl) (1  )n 1 (1  Fl (p))n 1+(1  q) (p  ch)
n 1X
k=0

n  1
k

k (1  )n 1 k (1  Fb (p))n 1 k = 1;
where 1 is a constant. If seller i chooses to learn the cost, his expected prot can be written as
i = q
plZ
pl
(p  cl)
Pn 1
k=0
 
n 1
k

k (1  )n 1 k

1  ~Fl (p)
k
dFl (p)   t: Applying again the indi¤er-
ence principle, we have
(2) (p  cl)
n 1X
k=0

n  1
k

k (1  )n 1 k (1  Fl (p))k = 2:
Since competing sellers are identical, they must all earn zero expected prots in the equilibrium.
Hence, we must have1 = 0 and2 = t=q: Thus, from (1), we can get q (p  cl) (1  )n 1 (1  Fb (p))n 1+
(1  q) (p  ch) (+ (1  ) (1  Fb (p)))n 1 = 0; i.e., Fb (p) = 1  1 

q(p cl)
(1 q)(ch p)
 1
n 1   1
 1
;
from (2), we can get (  Fl (p) + (1  ))n 1 = tq(p cl) ; i.e., Fl (p) =
1 

t
q(p cl)
 1
n 1
 : Since
Fb
 
pb

= 0; we must have q
 
pb   cl

(1  )n 1 + (1  q)  pb   ch = 0: Solving, we obtain
pb =
(1 q)ch+q(1 )n 1cl
(1 q)+q(1 )n 1 : Similarly, we can obtain pb = ch; pl = cl + t=q and pl = cl +
t
q(1 )n 1 : In
addition, we have pl = pb; so cl + tq(1 )n 1 =
(1 q)ch+q(1 )n 1cl
(1 q)+q(1 )n 1 : From this, we can solve for the
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assessment probability:  = 1 

t(1 q)
q((ch cl)(1 q) t)
1=(n 1)
: The expected price is
E (p) = n (1  q) ch + nq
Z
pd (1  (1  Fl (p))n) + (1  )n
Z
pd (1  (1  Fb (p))n)
+
n 1X
k=1

n  1
k

k (1  )n k

(1  q)
Z
pd

1  (1  Fb (p))n k

+ q
Z
pd

1  (1  Fl (p))k

= n (1  q) ch +
Z 1
0
0BBBBBBB@
nnqF 1l (F ) (1  F )n 1
+ (1  )n nF 1b (F ) (1  F )n 1
+
Pn 1
k=1
 
n 1
k

k (1  )n k
0B@ (1  q) (n  k)F 1b (F ) (1  F )n k 1
+qkF 1l (F ) (1  F )k 1
1CA
1CCCCCCCA
dF
= n (1  q) ch + n
Z 1
0
0B@ q (1  F )n 1 F 1l (F )
+ (1  )n (1  F )n 1

q + (1  q)


(1 )(1 F ) + 1
n 1
F 1b (F )
1CA dF
(3)
= n (1  q) ch + n
Z 1
0
0B@ t+ q (1  F )n 1 cl
+ (1  )n (1  F )n 1

qcl + (1  q) ch


(1 )(1 F ) + 1
n 1
1CA dF
= qcl + (1  q) ch + nt = cE + nt
Summarizing, we have the following results:
Lemma 3 If the consumer searches n  2 sellers, each seller chooses to assess the production
cost with a probability of  = 1  

t(1 q)
q((ch cl)(1 q) t)
1=(n 1)
: If a seller learns that the production
cost is ch; he quotes a price of ch; otherwise he quotes a price according to the distribution of
Fl (p) =
1 

t
q(p cl)
1=(n 1)
 , with pl = cl + t=q and pl =
(1 q)ch+q(1 )n 1cl
(1 q)+q(1 )n 1 : If a seller does not
make the assessment e¤ort, he quotes a price according to the price distribution of Fb (p) = 1  

1 

q(p cl)
(1 q)(ch p)
 1
n 1   1
 1
; with pb = pl and pb = ch: The expected price is cE + nt:
Figure 1 illustrates how the assessment cost a¤ects the price distributions. The red solid
curve depicts the price distribution when t = 0:2 (ch   cl) and the black dashed curve when
t = 0:1 (ch   cl) : For each level of assessment cost, there are two segments of price distributions,
corresponding to informed bids and blind bids.
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Figure 1: The red solid curve depicts the price distribution when t = 0:2 (ch   cl) and the black
dashed curve when t = 0:1 (ch   cl) : For both, q = 1=2:
From the graph, we can see that sellers are more likely to set low blind bids when t is large.
Intuitively, a larger t makes sellers less likely to do assessments and this gives uninformed sellers a
greater chance to win. In response to that, uninformed sellers bid more aggressively. The e¤ects of
a larger t on the bidding behavior of a seller informed of a low cost, however, are more complicated:
on one hand, having fewer competing bids raises the lower bound of informed bids; on the other
hand, more aggressive bidding by uninformed sellers lowers the upper bound of informed bids.
Therefore, a larger t decreases the degree of dispersion in informed bids.
3 Equilibrium Properties
Consumer surplus is maximized in the benchmark case, but it requires the consumer and sellers
to be able to contract on the latters assessment e¤ort. In reality, sellersassessment e¤ort is not
veriable so the benchmark outcome cannot be obtained. The second best outcome is for the
consumer to commit to the number of searches before sellers o¤er competing bids. This is possible
only if the number of searches is publicly observable. Accordingly, I analyze two cases, depending
on whether n is publicly observable or private information.
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3.1 The Number of Price Quotes is Publicly Observable
The consumer surplus can be written as v cE minn2 (t+ s)n: Relative to the benchmark case,
it is lower by minn2 (t+ s)n 2s: The term (t+ s)n captures the overall impact of precontract
costs, including consumer search cost and price setting cost, on consumer welfare. It does not
contribute to sellersprot margin and is merely a waste caused by market frictions, but for the
lack of better names I shall call it the expected markup and denote it by  (n; s; t) : Lemma 4
summarizes how the expected markup (essentially the negative of consumer surplus) varies with
the number of searches for di¤erent combinations of parameter values. For ease of exposition, I
ignore the integer constraint on n in this section.
Lemma 4 For given values of s and t; let  (n) =  (n; s; t) = (t+ s)n and  =   ln t(1 q)q((ch cl)(1 q) t) ;
(i)  (n) monotonically increases with n on (1;1) if 1 + s=t  e 2 (4=   1) ; otherwise,
(ii:a) if s = 0; then  (n) is unimodal on (1;1);
(ii:b) If s > 0; then  (n) has two critical points on (1;1). Denote them by fn1; n2g ; where
n1 < n2;  (n) is maximized at n1 and minimized at n2: If 1 + s=t < e  (2 + 1) and  < 1: 256 ;
then n1 < 2 < n2; if 1 + s=t 2
 
e  (2 + 1) ; e 2 (4=   1) and  < 1; then n1 < n2  2; if
1 + s=t 2  e  (2 + 1) ; e 2 (4=   1) and  > 1; then 2 < n1 < n2:
(iii) if n!1; then  (n)! ns+ t:
Proof. Let z = = (n  1) ; we have n = =z + 1;  = 1  exp ( z) ; @@t < 0; and @@nz =   (n 1)2 =
  z2 : Thus,  (n) can be rewritten as ((1  exp ( = (n  1))) t+ s)n = ((1  exp ( z (n))) t+ s)n =
t

(1+s=t) exp z 1
z

( + z) exp ( z). Hence,  0 (n) = tz exp ( z)

(1+s=t) exp z 1
z   +z

: Let
(4)  (z; ) = 
(1 + s=t) exp z   1
z (z + )
:
Using LHopitals rule (Estrada and Pavlovic 2017), we can verify that  (z; ) is convex in z and
increases with ; limz!0  (z; ) = 
(1+s=t) exp z
2z+ jz=0 = 1+s=t  1 and limz!0 z (z; ) =  1+s=t2 < 0:
(i) Since z (z; ) = 
(+2z)+ez( 2z +z+z2)(1+s=t)
z2(z+)2
;  (z; ) is minimized when
(5) (1 + s=t) exp z =
 + 2z
 + 2z   z   z2 :
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Since  (z; ) is convex in z; (5) has a unique solution. Denote it by z: Hence, minz  (z; ) =
 (1+s=t) exp z
 1
z(z+) =

+2z z z2 = 1 if z
 = 2   : Since z solves (5) ; minz  (z; ) = 1 if and
only if (5) holds when z = 2   ; i.e., (1 + s=t) exp (2  ) = 4=   1: Denote its solution by :
Thus, minz  (z; ) = 1: Since  (z; ) > 0; we must have minz  (z; )  1 for all    by the
Envelope Theorem. Therefore,  0 (n)  0 if   ; i.e., 1 + s=t  e 2 (4=   1) :
(ii) Now suppose  < : If n is a critical point, then we must have  (z; ) = 1: There are two
critical points if and only if minz  (z; ) < 1:
(ii:a) If s = 0; then  = 2: Since  (z; ) is convex in z, limz!0  (z; ) = 1 and limz!0 z (z; ) <
0: There is a unique solution of z for  (z; ) = 1 on (0;1) : Denote it by z^:  0 (n) > 0 if and only
if z > z^: Thus n^ = =z^ + 1 must be the unique critical point on (1;1) and  0 (n) ? 0 if n 7 n^:
(ii:b) If s > 0; then  < 2; since e 2 (4=   1) decreases with : For  < ; e 2 (4=   1) >
1 + s=t; there are two solutions of z for  (z; ) = 1 on (0;1). Denote them by z1 and z2, where
z1 > z2: Thus,  0 (n) < 0 if and only if z 2 (z2; z1) : Hence, ni = =zi + 1; i = 1; 2; must be
the only two critical points on (1;1), with  0 (n) < 0 if and only if n 2 (n1; n2) : As a result, n1
maximizes  (n) and n2 minimizes  (n) : If s=t < e  (2 + 1) 1; then  (z; ) jz= < 1: Note that
e  (2 + 1) > 1 if and only if  < 1:256: Since  (z; ) is convex in z and  (z1; ) =  (z2; ) = 1; we
must have z2 <  < z1; i.e., n1 < 2 < n2: If s=t > e  (2 + 1) 1; then  (z; ) jz= > 1. It is easy to
verify that e  (2 + 1) < e 2 (4=   1) if  6= 1 and e  (2 + 1) = e 2 (4=   1) = 3=e if  = 1.
Since z (z; ) jz= = 0 when  = 1 and z (z; ) > 0; we must have z (z; ) jz= ? 0 when  ? 1:
Thus, if  < 1; we have z (z; ) jz= < 0; so  < z2 < z1; i.e., n1 < n2 < 2; otherwise, z2 < z1 < ;
i.e., 2 < n1 < n2: Last, if  = 1; then we cannot have e  (2 + 1) < 1 + s=t < e 2 (4=   1) :
(iii) limn!1 n = limz!0 (1  e z) +zz = limz!0 e z (z+)
2
 = ; so limn!1 (t+ s)n = t +
sn:
According to Lemma 4, there are three possible patterns of how the expected markup varies
with the number of searches. Figure 2 illustrates these possibilities. When the assessment cost
t is small (the blue dashed curve at the bottom), the expected markup monotonically increases
with n; when t is large but s is zero (the black dotted curve in the middle), the expected markup
rst increases with n; then decreases; when t is large and s is positive (the red solid curve at the
top), the expected markup increases between 0 and n1; then decreases between n1 and n2; and
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then increases again for n > n2, where n1 is a local maxima and n2 is a local minima as dened in
Lemma 4.
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large t, s>0
small t
Figure 2 (q = 1=2): The expected markup as a function of n: Blue dashed
(t = 0:05 (ch   cl) ; s = 0) ; Black dotted (t = 0:15 (ch   cl) ; s = 0) ; Red solid
(t = 0:15 (ch   cl) ; s = 0:005 (ch   cl)) :
Hence, there are at most three candidates for the optimal number of price quotes: 2, n2; or
innity, with the last candidate, innity, being optimal only if s = 0: Therefore, the optimal number
of price quotes can simply be determined by comparing three numbers,  (2) ;  (n2) and  (1) :
The only remaining di¢ culty is to determine  (n2) ; as n2 does not have an analytical solution,
but we can rely on studying the monotonicity and oscillation of the expected markup as a function
of n to accomplish the task.
3.1.1 The Optimal Number of Searches
Suppose that no is the optimal number of price quotes, then we must have no = arg minn2  (n; s; t).
Proposition 2 summarizes the choices of no for di¤erent parameter values of s and t.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the number of price quotes is publicly observable. If s = 0; then
no > 2 if and only if tch cl >
q(1 q)
4:92(1 q)+q ; if s > 0; then n
o > 2 if and only if tch cl >
q(1 q)
(1 q)e+q and
s=t < e  (2 + 1)   1; or tch cl <
q(1 q)
(1 q)e+q and s=t < e
 2 (4=   1)   1 and 2 (1 + s=t  e ) >
(z+)2
 exp ( z) ; where z is the larger root for  (1+s=t) exp z 1z(z+) = 1 and  =   ln t(1 q)q((ch cl)(1 q) t) :
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Proof. If s = 0; by Lemma 4 (ii:a) ; we only need to compare  (2) and  (1) : By Lemma 4 (iii),
limn!1  (n) = t; whereas  (2) = 2t

1 

t(1 q)
q((ch cl)(1 q) t)

: Since 1   exp ( ) < =2 for
 > 1: 594; we have  (2) < limn!1  (n) if and only if
t(1 q)
q((ch cl)(1 q) t) < exp ( 1:594) ; i.e., t <
q(1 q)
4:92(1 q)+q (ch   cl) : The reason why s = 0 has to be considered as a special case is due its di¤erent
asymptotic behavior: limn!1  0 (n) = s if s > 0; but  0 (n) < 0 and limn!1  0 (n) = 0 if s = 0:
If s > 0; by Lemma 4 (ii:b) ; there are four possibilities:
(i)  (n) is increasing on (1;1) when  > ; i.e., tch cl 
q(1 q)
(1 q)e+q : Hence, n
o = 2:
(ii) n1 < 2 < n2 when 1 + s=t < e  (2 + 1) and  < 1:256: Since  (n) is decreasing on the
interval of [2; n2] ;  (n2) <  (2) : Therefore, no = n2 > 2:
(iii) n1 < n2 < 2 when 1 + s=t 2
 
e  (2 + 1) ; e 2 (4=   1) and  < 1: Since  (n) is
increasing on the interval of (n2;1) ;  (n2) <  (2) < limn!1  (n) : In addition, no  2; so we
must have no = 2:
(iv) 2 < n1 < n2 when 1 + s=t 2
 
e  (2 + 1) ; e 2 (4=   1) and  > 1: Since  (n)
increases on [2; n1] and then decreases on [n1; n2] ; no = arg minn2f2;n2g  (n) : Since  (2) =
(1+s=y) exp z 1
z

( + z) exp ( z) jz= = 2 (1 + s=t  e ) and  (n2) =

(1+s) exp z 1
z

( + z) exp ( z)
where  (1+s=t) exp z 1z(z+) = 1; n
o > 2 if 2 (1 + s=t  e ) > (z+)2 exp ( z) :
Therefore, in order for no > 2; if  < 1; i.e., tch cl >
q(1 q)
(1 q)e+q ; then we must have s=t <
e  (2 + 1)   1; if  > 1; i.e., tch cl <
q(1 q)
(1 q)e+q ; then we must have s=t < e
 2 (4=   1)   1 and
2 (1 + s=t  e ) > (z+)2 exp ( z) :
Proposition 2 shows that, frequently, the optimal number of searches is two.14 We can see
this result more clearly from Figure 3, where q = 1=2: The optimal number of searches is two in
all regions but the lower-right corner. It is true even when the search cost goes to zero. This
result is reminiscent of the model of Fullerton and McAfee (1999), which nds it optimal to include
only two contestants in a research tournament. In their model, restricting entry to two competitors
decreases the coordination problem of competing contestants and minimizes the duplication of xed
costs. Similarly, in the current model, limiting the number of bidders creates better incentives at
the assessment stage and reduces duplication in e¤orts. One should be careful, however, about
applying this result in practice because the model incorporates two features that lower the benet
14Honka (2014) nds that consumers get on average 2.96 quotes with the majority of consumers collecting two or
three quotes when purchasing auto insurance policies.
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from additional searches. First, sellers face the same production costs, so additional search does not
o¤er opportunities to discover more e¢ cient sellers; second, only one product meets the need of the
consumer, so additional searches does not o¤er opportunities to discover new solutions. If those
opportunities are present in a more realistic environment, then a consumer may want to search
more than two sellers.
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Figure 3 (q = 1=2): the solid curve represents s=t = e  (2 + 1)  1 and the dashed one
represents e 2 (4=   1)  1: The green segment (t > 0:0845) on the horizontal axis represents
the values of t such that no = 2:
While the equilibrium outcome shares some similarities with existing models of consumer search,
e.g., there is price dispersion even with ex ante identical and rational consumers and sellers, there
are important di¤erences. In all existing search models with homogeneous sellers, the limiting
result when search cost approaches zero is the Bertrand competition outcome, in which there is no
price dispersion,15 but price dispersion persists in this model even when search cost vanishes. At
rst glance, this result is not surprising: after all, sellersassessment cost can be seen as a part
of the overall search cost that is indirectly paid by the consumer, so zero direct search cost does
not imply zero overall search cost. However, it will be wrong to extend this line of reasoning to
conclude that the introduction of price setting cost adds nothing but splitting the di¤erence. As
shown in Proposition 2, the consumer is more likely to search a large number of sellers when s is
15Sellers in Baye and Morgan (2001) have identical costs, but each of them is also a local monopoly.
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small and when t is large. The rst e¤ect is quite obvious, but the second one is not. When t rises,
one might think that the consumer should search less since she has to indirectly pay for sellers
assessment cost, but this intuition is incomplete because it ignores the e¤ect of an increase in n on
sellerspropensity to assess. As shown in the following comparative statics analysis, the e¤ects of
search cost and assessment cost are quite di¤erent.
3.1.2 Comparative Statics
In this section, I examine the impact of search cost and assessment cost on the equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 3 summarizes the impact of s and t on the optimal number of searches.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the number of price quotes is publicly observable, the optimal number
of searches no
(i) decreases with s;
(ii) is non-monotonic in t if s > 0; but increases with t if s = 0:
Proof. (i) Suppose that no changes to no0 and n2 changes to n02 when s increases to s0 > s: To
prove that no is (weakly) decreasing in s, we need to show no0  no:
If s = 0; by Lemma 4 (ii:a) ; no = arg minn2f2;1g  (n; 0; t) and no0 = arg minn2f2;n02g  (n; s
0; t) :
We only need to prove that no0 cannot be n02 > 2 when no = 2; i.e.,  (n02; s0; t) >  (2; s0; t) when
 (n02; 0; t) >  (2; 0; t) ; but this is true because  (n02; s0; t) =  (n02; 0; t) + n02s0 >  (2; 0; t) + 2s0 =
 (2; s0; t) :
If s > 0; by Lemma 4 (ii:b) ; no = arg minn2f2;n2g  (n; s; t) and n
o0 = arg minn2f2;n02g  (n; s
0; t) :
By the Envelope theorem,
(6) sign
dn2
ds
= sign  @
2
@n@s
 (n; s; t) = ( ) ;
since @
2
@n@s (n; s; t) = 1: Hence, n
0
2 < n2: Suppose that n
o = n2; then no0 will be greater than no
only if n02 > no; but n02 < n2 = no by (6). Suppose that no = 2; then no0 will be greater than no
only if n02 > 2; i.e.,  (2; s; t) <  (n2; s; t) and  (2; s0; t) >  (n02; s0; t) ; but  (2; s0; t) =  (2; s; t) +
2 (s0   s) <  (n2; s; t)+2 (s0   s)   (n2; s; t)+n02 (s0   s) <  (n02; s; t)+n2 (s0   s) =  (n02; s0; t) ;
contradiction.
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(ii) is immediate from Proposition 2.
According to Proposition 3, search cost and assessment cost can sometimes have opposite e¤ects
on the optimal number of searches. To gain some intuition behind this surprising result, consider
the limiting cases where s = 0: If t = 0; then the consumer only needs to visit two sellers to
obtain the competitive price according to Proposition 1. In contrast, if t ! 1; then no seller
will ever make an e¤ort to discover the true cost, but it will be best for the consumer to visit as
many sellers as possible. Hence, the consumer ends up visiting more sellers when the sellerse¤ort
becomes more costly. As such, search cost and assessment cost can have very di¤erent impacts on
consumerssearch behavior, even though they both appear to contribute to the overall precontract
cost. This means that it is not only the total cost, but also the composition of the cost, that matters
to consumer search. A similar result exists for two-sided markets, but the underlying mechanism is
much di¤erent. In two-sided markets the composition of the cost matters because the cost imposed
on one side cannot be fully internalized by the other side of the market, whereas in this model it
matters despite consumersfull internalization of sellerscosts.
Let ' (s; t) = minn2 (t+ s)n denote the minimized expected markup as a function of s and
t: Proposition 4 examines the welfare impact of the two costs.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the number of price quotes is publicly observable, ' (s; t)
(i) monotonically increases with s;
(ii) is unimodal in t.
Proof. (i) By Lemma 4; ' (s; t) = min f (2) ;  (n2) ;  (1)g : By the Envelope Theorem, dds (n2) =
n2 > 0: At the same time, dds (2) = 2 > 0 and
d
ds (1) = n > 0: Therefore, @@s' (s; t) > 0:
(ii) First, ddt (2) =
@
@t

1  t(1 q)q((1 q) t)

t = t
2 2t(1 q)+q(1 q)2
q(1 q t)2 ;
d2
dt2
 (2) = @
2
@t2

1  t(1 q)q((1 q) t)

t =
 2q (1 q)
3
(1 q t)3 < 0; so  (2) increases with t if and only if t < 1 q 
q
(1  q)3: Second, by the Envelope
Theorem, ddt (n2) =
@
@t (1  exp ( = (n2   1))) tn2 =  n2

e
  
n2 1   1

@
@t < 0; i.e.,  (n2) de-
creases with t: Third, by Lemma 4 (iii) ; d
2
dt2
 (1) = @2
@t2

 t ln t(1 q)q((1 q) t)

=  1t (1 q)
2
(1 q t)2 < 0: If s >
0; by Lemma 4 (ii:b) ; ' (s; t) = min f (2) ;  (n2)g ; Since  (2) and  (n2) are both quasi-concave,
' (s; t) must be quasi-concave in t. If s = 0; by Lemma 4 (ii:a) ; ' (s; t) = min f (2) ;  (1)g : Since
 (2) and  (1) are both concave in t, ' (s; t) must be concave in t: Last, since ' (s; 0) = ' (s; t) ;
where t = q (1  q) (ch   cl) ; ' (s; t) must be unimodal in t:
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Perhaps not surprisingly, the consumer benets from a lower search cost, though it turns out
to be true only if the consumer has the ability to commit, otherwise the opposite result may
be obtained, as shown in the next section. More interestingly, the consumer can benet from a
further increase in the assessment cost when it is already large. This directly follows from our
earlier observation that a high assessment cost can discourage sellers from engaging in wasteful
and duplicative assessment e¤orts, which are indirectly paid by the consumer. Another way to
understand why the expected total expense is not monotonic in the assessment cost is to recall
Proposition 1: when t = 0; by denition the cost of assessment e¤ort will be zero; when t 
q (1  q) (ch   cl) ; there will be no wasteful expenditure on assessment because the cost exceeds
the value of the information. Between the two extremes, however, there will be positive amounts
of (wasteful) assessment e¤orts.
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.24
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
t
n=infinity
n=2
Figure 4: The black solid curve depicts  (2) and the red dashed curve is  (1) ; with both as
functions of t: The lower envelope is the expected markup.
Figure 4 illustrates in more detail how the expected markup varies with t. When t is small, the
cost of information is small relative to it value, so sellers are more likely to make the assessment
e¤ort. At the same time, given that sellers have the same production cost, the gain from having
additional competition is relatively small, so the consumer is better o¤ by visiting just two sellers.
This minimizes search costs as well as sellersinformation rents. When t is large,  decreases with
n at a faster rate so the consumer will be better o¤ by increasing n: To see this e¤ect more clearly,
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I plot  (n) = (2) in Figure 5. The graph illustrates three results: rst, the propensity to assess 
decreases with n across all ranges of t; second, sellers are less likely to make the assessment e¤ort
when t is large; these two results are obvious. Less obvious is the third result, namely,  decreases
at a faster rate when t is large. This means that increasing the number of searches can potentially
reduce the wasteful and duplicative assessment e¤orts when t is large. This is true if the rate of
decrease in  is greater than the rate of increase in n:
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Figure 5: y =  (n) = (2) ; when t = 0:02; 0:1; 0:15
Up to this point, we have focused on the consumers total expense, next I consider the expected
price. The two are obviously correlated, but the correlation is not perfect: even if an additional
search leads to a lower price, the total expense could increase because of the extra search cost.
Hence, we cannot simply use the results above to predict the price e¤ects. In order to have
empirically testable predictions on prices and compare with the noncommitment case discussed
later, we need the following results:
Proposition 5 Suppose that the number of price quotes n is publicly observable, the expected price
(i) increases with n if tch cl <
q(1 q)
(1 q)e2+q ;
(ii:a) decreases with n if tch cl 
q(1 q)
(1 q)e2+q and n2  2; (ii:b) increases with n on the interval
of [2; n2] and then decreases with n on (n2;1) if tch cl 
q(1 q)
(1 q)e2+q and n2 > 2;
(iii) increases with s.
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Proof. (i) and (ii) are immediate from the proof of Lemma 4 (i) and (ii:a) :
(iii) By the Envelope theorem, ddsE (pjn = n2) = dds (n2)   ddsn2s = n2   n2   sdn2ds  0:
At the same time, E (pjn = 2) is a constant with respect to s. By Proposition 3, no decreases
with s: This means that, when s increases to s0; we cannot have no = 2 and no0 = n2 > 2:
Hence, the only possibility for a price decreases after an increase in s is to have  (n2) <  (2)
but E (pjn = n2) > E (pjn = 2) : If this is true, then we must have  (n2)   2s <  (2)   2s =
E (pjn = 2) < E (pjn = n2) =  (n2)  n2s; contradiction.
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Figure 6: The expected price as a function of n: Blue dotted (t = 0:05 (ch   cl) ; s = 0) ; Black
solid (t = 0:15 (ch   cl) ; s = 0) ; Red dashed (t = 0:15 (ch   cl) ; s = 0:005 (ch   cl)) : In all cases,
q = 1=2:
In classic models of consumer search, prices are either set before consumer search or at the
same time. This implies that consumerssearch intensity cannot alter price distributions, so the
expected price has to decrease with the number of searches. However, if prices are set after consumer
search, then the e¤ect of more searches on the nal price is not obvious: on one hand, competition
lowers price; on the other hand, competition causes sellers more likely to submit blind quotes that
are inated to avoid winners curse. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 6, it is possible that more
searches result in a high price. To understand why, recall that the consumer indirectly pays for the
assessment cost. When the consumer searches more sellers, each seller will have a smaller chance
of being the winning bidder and so will in equilibrium seek a higher expected prot in the event
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of winning, which is translated into a higher price. To researchers of auctions, this result is not
surprising. It is by now a well-known result that the expected revenue may be decreasing in the
number of potential bidders when there are participation costs (Harstad 1990). Proposition 5 shows
that the same can happen in a search model.16
Unlike other models of costly consumer search, the current model does not predict that the
expected price approaches the marginal cost when s! 0; but it so far still maintains the standard
result that the expected price increases with the search cost, according to Proposition 5 (iii). This
result, however, will be overturned once we relax the assumption that the consumer can commit to
the optimal number of searches, as shown below.
3.1.3 Economic Signicance of Assessment Costs
While the above model generates some interesting results, they will not matter much if the as-
sessment cost only has a small impact on consumer welfare. In order to evaluate its economic
signicance, I compare the expected total expense under costly e¤ort to the benchmark case, in
which the total expense is just the expected production cost plus the search costs, cE + 2s: To
focus on the impact of assessment cost, I further assume s = 0, in which case no is either 2 or 1.
Another measure that can be used is the expected price plus the assessment costs, but it generates
the same qualitative result.17
16Satterthwaite (1979) shows that an increased number of sellers may perversely cause the equilibrium price to rise
in a monopolistically competitive industry that sells a reputation good.
17Consumer surplus is a less appropriate measure, because it depends on v; an arbitrary parameter in the model.
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Figure 7: ' (s; t) =cE as a function of t= (ch   cl) when q = 1=2: The solid curve has n = 2 and the
dashed n!1:
Figure 7 plots ' (s; t) =cE when q = 1=2; with the the solid curve corresponding to the case
of n = 2 and the dashed n ! 1; so the lower envelope is the expected cost when n is optimally
chosen. As we can see from the graph, the existence of an incontractible assessment cost can
potentially increase the consumers total expense by more than one half. This clearly demonstrates
that it is not a negligible cost and should be taken seriously not only for its theoretical interests,
but also for its practical importance. As such, it o¤ers an alternative explanation for why car
buyers obtain signicantly more of the surplus available under customer rebate than under dealer
discount, a nding that is counter to the simple invariance of incidence analogy (Busse, Silva-Risso
and Zettelmeyer 2006). Busse et al. test several hypotheses and nd evidence consistent with the
asymmetric information hypothesis, that is, car buyers are disadvantaged in negotiations because
they are less informed than dealers about the availability of dealer discounts. In contrast, the parties
are symmetrically informed about the availability of customer rebates, which are always publicized
to potential customers, often in prime-time television advertisements. Note that their explanation is
based on the assumption that the information about dealer discounts is readily accessible to dealers.
However, these discounts are often in the form of conditional discounts, depending on geographical
location and/or specic equipment package, or trim level. This means that there may be a
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higher assessment costs for dealer discounts than for customer rebate.18 Thus, the pass-through
from dealer discounts can be lower as a result.
3.2 The Number of Price Quotes is Non-contractible Private Information
As mentioned earlier, if n is non-contractible private information, then the consumer faces a credi-
bility problem: sellersbidding strategy depends on their conjecture of the number of competitors;
but holding their belief and the corresponding bidding strategy constant, the consumer always
benets from have a larger sample size. To see this, consider the lowest price from obtaining
n price quotes, taking the price distribution as given. Denote it by pmin. Since the overall
CDF for a sellers price distribution is F (p) = (1  )Fb (p) +  (qFl (p) + (1  q)1 (p  ch)) ;
where 1 () is the indicator function, Fl (p) and Fb (p) are given in Lemma 3, the CDF of pmin is
Pr(pmin < p) = 1 ni=1 Pr (pi > p) = 1  (1  F (p))n. Assuming that these expectations are nite,
we have E (pmin) =
R1
0 (1  (1  F (p))n) dF (p) =
R1
0 (1  F (p))n dn:
(7)
d
dn
E (pmin) =
Z 1
0
(1  F (p))n ln (1  F (p)) dp < 0:
(8)
d2
dn2
E (pmin) =
Z 1
0
(1  F (p))n (ln (1  F (p)))2 dp > 0:
Equation (7) and (8) show that, given the sellers bidding strategies, a consumer obtains lower
prices as she searches more sellers, but the incremental gain from further price reductions becomes
smaller and smaller. This is essentially the original insight of Stigler (1961). Under the assumption
that the price distributions are completely exogenous, he argues that increased search will yield
positive but diminishing returns as measured by the expected reduction in the minimum asking
price whatever the precise distribution of prices.19 Figure 8 illustrates (7) and (8) for the case
18According to a web site specialized on automobile markets: "Even if you are the only customer in the dealership,
there is still no guarantee youll be able to get a deal o¤er in a ash. If youre taking out a loan, the sales manager
might have to run your credit to get your credit score. Hell call the nance department to get your interest rate,
and then look up specials and incentives on your car to make sure youre getting the right program o¤er for the right
car. Sometimes it just takes a while to get all the information together." Matt Jones, "Behind the Scenes at A Car
Dealership", April 29th, 2016, https://www.edmunds.com/car-buying/behind-the-scenes-at-a-car-dealership.html.
19His article contains a sketch of the proof, attributed to Robert Solow.
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where sellers believe they only face one competitor, but the consumer engages in n = 1; 2 or 3
searches (The mathematical expressions are derived in Appendix A).
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.24
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
t
E(p_min)
n=3
n=2
n=1
Figure 8: E (pmin) as a function of t= (ch   cl) : The dashed line on the top represents E (pmin)
when n = 1; the solid one in the middle E (pmin) when n = 2; the dotted one at the bottom
E (pmin) when n = 3: In all case, q = 1=2.
In this section, I model the consumers problem by studying a simultaneous move version of the
game. More specically, I modify the original game by assuming that stage 1 consumer search and
stage 2 seller bidding take place at the same time. In other words, n is not observed by the sellers
when they choose their bids and the consumer cannot precommit to the optimal number of searches.
Instead, sellers must form beliefs about the number of other sellers visited by the consumer. In
the Nash equilibrium, their beliefs must be correct. At the same time, given sellersbeliefs and
pricing strategies, the consumer has no incentive to search more or fewer sellers. Formally, let
	 (n;m) denote the expected markup, where n represents the actual number of price quotes and m
a sellers belief about the number of price quotes including his own. Let the corresponding lowest
price quote pmin be denoted by E (pminjn;m) : The equilibrium conditions are: (1) m = n; (2)
n = arg mink 	 (k; n) ; where 	 (k; n) = E (pminjk; n) + ks; and (3) 	 (n; n) =  (n) = (t+ s)n:
I further assume that s < E (pminj1; 2)   E (pminj2; 2) so that the consumer will not use mixed
strategies in the equilibrium.20
20 If s > E (pminj1; 2) E (pminj2; 2) ; then again the consumer might randomize between searching once and twice,
as in footnote 13. This will make the equilibrium exceedingly di¢ cult to solve.
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Suppose that nPI is the equilibrium number of price quotes when n is private information, then
we must have 	
 
nPI ; nPI
  	  n; nPI for any n; i.e.,
(9) E
 
pminjnPI ; nPI

+ nPIs  E  pminjn; nPI+ ns:
By (7) and (8) ; we know that E (pminjn;m)   E (pminjn+ 1;m) is positive and strictly decreases
with n: Condition (9) can thus be rewritten as
(10) E
 
pminjnPI ; nPI
 E  pminjnPI + 1; nPI  s < E  pminjnPI   1; nPI E  pminjnPI ; nPI ;
which is the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of a search equilibrium. From (10),
we can easily see that nPI !1 when s! 0; regardless of the optimal number of price quotes. This
observation gives us the basic intuition why the equilibrium number of price quotes may deviate
from the optimum.
The full characterization of the equilibrium is challenging and the uniqueness of the equilibrium
is not guaranteed. Fortunately, they are not required for us to see the main qualitative results. In
the following analysis, I will demonstrate by way of examples that the conventional wisdom on the
market impact of search cost does not extend to the current setting.
3.2.1 Search Cost and Price
Proposition 6 Suppose that the number of price quotes n is private information, the expected
equilibrium price may decrease with s if tch cl <
q(1 q)
4:92(1 q)+q :
Proof. Suppose that initially s  E (pminj2; 2) E (pminj3; 2) ; then we must have nPI = 2 according
to (10) and the condition that s < E (pminj1; 2)   E (pminj2; 2) : If s decreases to 0; then nPI > 2;
but 	 (n; n) =  (n) > 	 (2; 2) =  (2) for n > 2 if tch cl <
q(1 q)
4:92(1 q)+q by Proposition 2.
Proposition 6 considers the price impact of search costs. In contrast to Proposition 5 (iii), the
expected price is no longer monotonically increasing in the search cost if the consumer is unable
to precommit. This is because, relative to the commitment case, the search cost has a more direct
impact on the number of searches. While a consumer with commitment must take into account the
impact of additional searches on the price distribution, a consumer without commitment takes the
29
price distribution as given. Consequently, a lower search cost is more likely to tempt a consumer
without the commitment power to engage in additional searches, but this can cause sellers to quote
higher prices in order to compensate for their smaller chances of winning the bidding war.
3.2.2 Excessive Search
Not only can a decrease in the search cost result in higher prices, as shown in Proposition 6, but it
can also lead to excessive searches.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the number of price quotes n is private information, nPI > no as
long as no = 2 and s < E (pminj2; 2)  E (pminj3; 2) :
Proof. Obvious.
In the noncommitment case, when a consumer decides whether to have one more price quote,
it is driven by the expected price decrease, holding sellersbelief and strategy constant. In the
commitment case, the marginal benet of searching one more rm is smaller. Therefore, given the
same search cost, the consumer has a stronger incentive to search more sellers if she is unable to
commit, but this incentive to search is too strong to maximize consumer surplus. In Figure 9, the
dashed line represents E (pminj1; 2) E (pminj2; 2) and the dotted one E (pminj2; 2) E (pminj3; 2) :
Recall from Figure 3 that no is two in the area above the solid line. Between the dashed line and the
dotted line, E (pminj2; 2) E (pminj3; 2) < s < E (pminj1; 2) E (pminj2; 2) ; hence nPI = 2: However,
between the dotted line and the solid curve, s < E (pminj2; 2) E (pminj3; 2) ; hence nPI > 2: Clearly,
there is a big range of parameter values for which consumer search may be excessive.21
21The discontinuity is due to the integer constraint on the number of price quotes.
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Figure 9: the dashed line represents E (pminj1; 2)  E (pminj2; 2) ; the dotted one
E (pminj2; 2)  E (pminj3; 2) : In the area above the solid line but below the dotted one, no = 2 but
nPI > 2:
It is worth noting that the current model assumes that the consumer cannot engage in multiple
rounds of searches. This assumption ensures that the consumer cannot rst infer the production
cost from her previous round of search and then use the information to incite a bidding war.
Assuming otherwise will only serve to exacerbate her commitment problem.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the number of price quotes n is private information, (i) consumers can
be worse o¤ when s decreases; (ii) both consumer surplus and social welfare can be increased if n
becomes publicly observable.
With the advance of the Internet, a lot of research has been devoted to understanding the
impact of search cost on consumer welfare. It is generally accepted that consumers benet from
lower search costs (Bakos 1997, Brown and Goolsbee 2002, Lin and Wildenbeest 2015). Even
in Wolinsky (2005), which otherwise nds that consumer search in the market for procurement
contracts can be excessive, the e¤ect of a lower search cost on welfare remains positive. Corollary
1, however, shows that a lower search cost, contrary to consensus, can sometimes leave consumers
worse o¤. This nding has two important implications: rst, when there are multiple sources of
transaction costs, police makers should be careful in prescribing cost reduction as the panacea for
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market imperfections; second, it explains the use of intermediaries as a commitment mechanism in
such markets.22 One such example is the online mortgage referral agent LendingTree.com, which
matches potential borrowers with various loan programs. A consumer who applies to LendingTree
receives four di¤erent o¤ers and each one quotes a price including interest rates and up-front fees.23
4 Conclusion
When consumers search, they incur costs. In order to provide consumers the information they
search for, sellers may also incur costs. This paper departs from the extant literature by assuming
that sellers must make an e¤ort to learn the true cost of providing the goods/services before they
bid against other sellers, but the consumer is unable to verify or contract on the sellers e¤ort in
preparing their bids, i.e., the price quotes. Despite its simplicity, the current model is a faithful
snapshot of procurement markets. It allows us to derive a number of new results that do not exist
in the search models of posted-price markets. These results caution against studying the impact of
consumer search cost without taking into account sellerscostly e¤ort in providing the information
sought by consumers. In particular, it shows that a decline of search cost does not necessarily
benet consumers, providing yet another argument why the advance of the Internet or even the
elimination of consumer search cost may not lead to the "law of one price."
These results also have important empirical implications. First, they suggest that the choice
of a small sample size when consumers search is not necessarily due to high search costs. Recent
empirical studies have documented surprisingly few searches conducted by consumers when shop-
ping for nancial products.24 The lack of consumer search has been attributed to high search costs
and non-price preferences, but it is also consistent with the existence of price setting costs. Indeed,
as shown in this paper, the optimal number of searches is frequently two. Empirical studies that
22 It should be noted that the type of intermediation suggested by this paper is di¤erent from market-making as
in Gehrig (1993), or match-making as in Spulber (1996) or information gatekeeping as in Baye and Morgan (2001),
but rather the referral types of services. Recent papers have also emphasized the role of intermediaries in reducing
search costs (Allen, Clark and Houde 2014) and generating search-externalities (Armstrong 2015, Salz 2017).
23Other examples include Better Business Bureau in the service market, Travelsuperlink.com in the travel market,
Insure.com and Quickquote.com in the insurance market. Salz (2017) gives a detailed account of intermediation
in the New York Citys trade waste market (see also https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/26/business/dividing-and-
conquering-the-trash.html).
24Honka (2014) documents evidence from the US auto insurance market, Allen, Clark and Houde (2014) and
Alexandrov and Koulayev (2017) from the Canadian and US mortgage markets, respectively, and Stango and Zinman
(2015) from the credit card market.
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do not take into account sellersprice setting costs may overestimate consumer search costs or the
impact of other factors. Second, they pose a challenge to empirical studies that attempt to recover
consumer search costs from the observed price distributions. In posted price markets, the standard
estimation strategy relies on a monotonicity assumption, i.e., prices are monotonically increasing
functions of the search costs (Hortacsu and Syverson 2004, Hong and Shum 2006), but the break-
down of monotonicity cautions against the direct extension of this approach to non-posted price
markets.
For policy makers, this paper o¤ers a cautionary message: regulations that aim to eliminate mar-
ket frictions but focus only on consumer search cost may end up worsening consumerscommitment
problem. A standard exercise, when making policy recommendations, is the use of counterfactual
analyses, but one must be careful in interpreting the results obtained from any of those analyses
that presume consumers would gain from reductions of search costs.
This paper is only the rst step in trying to understand the impact of sellers precontract
cost on consumer search behavior. For further exploration, it can be extended in a number of
directions. First, if the source of uncertainty in product costs is consumer specic, then a consumer
may have some private information. This is especially true for insurance markets. How consumer
private information a¤ects their search behavior remains an open question. Second, the current
model does not consider the possibility that custom solutions exist for di¤erent realizations of the
production costs. This e¤ectively rules out second-degree price discrimination by a single seller
or vertical di¤erentiation among multiple sellers. Third, the production cost is assumed to be a
binary variable that can be learned with perfect precision. Last, sellers are assumed to compete in
a common value auction.25 Extending the model by relaxing some of these assumptions can be the
basis of fruitful future work.
25 In MacMinn (1980) and Spulber (1995), sellersprice setting is equivalent to bidding in a private value auction.
Price dispersion arises from cost heterogeneity of sellers.
33
References
Alexandrov, A., and S. Koulayev (2017): No shopping in the us mortgage market: Direct
and strategic e¤ects of providing more information, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
O¢ ce of Research Working Paper No. 2017-01.
Allen, J., R. Clark, and J.-F. Houde (2014): The e¤ect of mergers in search markets:
Evidence from the Canadian mortgage industry, The American Economic Review, 104(10),
33653396.
Armstrong, M. (2015): Search and ripo¤ externalities, Review of Industrial Organization,
47(3), 273302.
Bakos, J. Y. (1997): Reducing buyer search costs: Implications for electronic marketplaces,
Management science, 43(12), 16761692.
Baye, M. R., and J. Morgan (2001): Information gatekeepers on the internet and the compet-
itiveness of homogeneous product markets,American Economic Review, pp. 454474.
Baye, M. R., J. Morgan, P. Scholten, et al. (2006): Information, search, and price dis-
persion,in Handbook on economics and information systems, ed. by T. Hendershott, vol. 1, pp.
32377. Elsevier.
Benabou, R., and R. Gertner (1993): Search with learning from prices: does increased ina-
tionary uncertainty lead to higher markups?,The Review of Economic Studies, 60(1), 6993.
Brown, J. R., and A. Goolsbee (2002): Does the Internet make markets more competitive?
Evidence from the life insurance industry,Journal of political economy, 110(3), 481507.
Burdett, K., and K. L. Judd (1983): Equilibrium price dispersion,Econometrica: Journal
of the Econometric Society, 51(4), 955969.
Busse, M., J. Silva-risso, and F. Zettelmeyer (2006): $1,000 cash back: The pass-through
of auto manufacturer promotions,The American economic review, 96(4), 12531270.
Coase, R. H. (1960): The problem of social cost,The journal of Law and Economics, 56(4),
837877.
34
Dahlman, C. J. (1979): The problem of externality,The journal of law and economics, 22(1),
141162.
Dana, Jr., J. D. (1994): Learning in an equilibrium search model, International Economic
Review, pp. 745771.
Daughety, A. F. (1992): A model of search and shopping by homogeneous customers without
price precommitment by rms,Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1(3), 455473.
Estrada, R., and M. Pavlovic (2017): LHôpitals monotone rule, Gromovs theorem, and
operations that preserve the monotonicity of quotients,Publications de lInstitut Mathematique,
101(115), 1124.
French, K. R., and R. E. McCormick (1984): Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of
Competition,The Journal of Business, 57(4), 417.
Fullerton, R. L., and R. P. McAfee (1999): Auctioning Entry into Tournaments,Journal
of Political Economy, 107(3), 573605.
Gehrig, T. (1993): Intermediation in search markets, Journal of Economics & Management
Strategy, 2(1), 97120.
Harstad, R. M. (1990): Alternative Common-Value Auction Procedures: Revenue Comparisons
with Free Entry,Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 421429.
Hong, H., and M. Shum (2006): Using price distributions to estimate search costs,The RAND
Journal of Economics, 37(2), 257275.
Honka, E. (2014): Quantifying search and switching costs in the US auto insurance industry,
The RAND Journal of Economics, 45(4), 847884.
Honka, E., and P. Chintagunta (2017): Simultaneous or sequential? search strategies in the
us auto insurance industry,Marketing Science, 36(1), 2142.
Hortaçsu, A., and C. Syverson (2004): Product di¤erentiation, search costs, and competition
in the mutual fund industry: A case study of S&P 500 index funds,The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 119(2), 403456.
35
Janssen, M. C. W., and J. L. Moraga-González (2004): Strategic Pricing, Consumer Search
and the Number of Firms,Review of Economic Studies, 71(4), 10891118.
Lin, H., M. R. Wildenbeest, et al. (2015): Search and prices in the medigap insurance
market,Discussion paper, Indiana University, Bloomington.
los Santos, B. D., A. Hortaçsu, and M. R. Wildenbeest (2012): Testing Models of Con-
sumer Search Using Data on Web Browsing and Purchasing Behavior, American Economic
Review, 102(6), 29552980.
MacMinn, R. D. (1980): Search and market equilibrium,Journal of Political Economy, 88(2),
308327.
McAfee, R. P., and J. McMillan (1988): Search mechanisms,Journal of Economic Theory,
44(1), 99123.
Morgan, P., and R. Manning (1985): Optimal search,Econometrica: Journal of the Econo-
metric Society, pp. 923944.
Pesendorfer, W., and A. Wolinsky (2003): Second Opinions and Price Competition: Ine¢ -
ciency in the Market for Expert Advice,Review of Economic Studies, 70(2), 417437.
Rothschild, M. (1974): Searching for the Lowest Price When the Distribution of Prices Is
Unknown,Journal of Political Economy, 82(4), 689711.
Satterthwaite, M. A. (1979): Consumer Information, Equilibrium Industry Price, and the
Number of Sellers,The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(2), 483502.
Spulber, D. F. (1995): Bertrand competition when rivalscosts are unknown,The Journal of
Industrial Economics, pp. 111.
(1996): Market making by price-setting rms,The Review of Economic Studies, 63(4),
559580.
Stango, V., and J. Zinman (2015): Borrowing high versus borrowing higher: price dispersion
and shopping behavior in the US credit card market,The Review of Financial Studies, 29(4),
9791006.
36
Stigler, G. J. (1961): The Economics of Information, Journal of Political Economy, 69(3),
213225.
Wolinsky, A. (2005): Procurement via Sequential Search,Journal of Political Economy, 113(4),
785810.
37
Appendix
A The Expected Price When the Number of Price Quotes is Pri-
vate Information
Let E (pminjn;m) denote the lowest price quoted by n sellers when each of them believes that the
consumer obtains m price quotes. Also let Fl;m (p) denote the corresponding price distribution of
informed bids, Fb;m (p) that of blind bids, and  the probability of a seller choosing to assess the
production cost. From (3) ; we obtain that
E (pminjn;m)
= n (1  q) ch + nq
Z
pd (1  (1  Fl;m (p))n) + (1  )n
Z
pd (1  (1  Fb;m (p))n)
+
n 1X
k=1

n  1
k

k (1  )n k

(1  q)
Z
pd

1  (1  Fb;m (p))n k

+ q
Z
pd

1  (1  Fl;m (p))k

= n (1  q) ch + n
Z 1
0
0B@ q (1  F )n 1 F 1l;m (F )
+ (1  )n (1  F )n 1

q + (1  q)


(1 )(1 F ) + 1
n 1
F 1b;m (F )
1CA dF
= n (1  q) ch + n
Z 1
0
0BB@ q (1  F )
n 1

cl +
t=q
(1 F )m 1

+ (1  )n (1  F )n 1


q + (1  q)


(1 )(1 F ) + 1
n 1 qcl+(1 q)ch (1 )(1 F )+1m 1
q+(1 q)


(1 )(1 F )+1
m 1
1CCA dF
= n (1  q) ch + qcl (1  (1  )n) + n
Z 1
0
t (1  F )n m dF
(11)
+ n
Z 1 
0
Gn 1

q + (1  q)

G
+ 1
n 1 qcl + (1  q) ch   G + 1m 1
q + (1  q)   G + 1m 1
!
dG:
From (11), we can get E (pminj1; 2) = cE+q (1  q) (ch   cl) ln 1 q(1 q) t ln (1  ) ; E (pminj2; 2) =
cE + 2t and E (pminj3; 2) = cE + 3t (1  =2) + 3q (1  q) (ch   cl)


2q (1  q) ln 1 q(1 q)   12 (1  ) (1  + 2q)

: It is not di¢ cult to verify that (7) and (8) hold.
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